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Abstract Corporate scandals brought the issue of corporate governance to the forefront of the agendas of lawmakers and regulators in the early 2000s. As a result,
Congress, the New York Stock Exchange, and the NASDAQ enacted standards to improve the quality of corporate
governance, thereby enhancing the quantity and quality of
disclosures by listed companies. We investigate the relationship between corporate governance strength and the
quality of disclosures in pre- and post-regulation time
periods. If cross-sectional differences in corporate governance policies affect the quality of financial disclosures,
the quality of information available to analysts varies with
such policies. Specifically, higher quality disclosures,
produced as a result of strong corporate governance, should
lead to more accurate and less dispersed analysts’ forecasts.
Our analysis suggests that voluntary implementation of
stronger corporate governance enhanced the quality of
disclosures in the pre-regulation period; however, exceeding current corporate governance standards does not appear
to result in higher quality disclosures post-regulation.
These results suggest that SOX and the stronger regulations
enacted by U.S. exchanges were effective in reducing
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variation in the quality of financial information available to
investors.
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Introduction
Corporate scandals brought the issue of corporate governance to the forefront of the agendas of lawmakers and
regulators in the early 2000s. In an effort to return confidence and stabilize markets, Congress, the New York Stock
Exchange, and the NASDAQ enacted standards to improve
the quality of corporate governance mechanisms (Switzer
2007).1 One of the primary objectives of these initiatives is
to enhance the validity of financial information by requiring corporate boards to be more independent and
accountable. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 directly
states that the purpose of the Act is ‘‘to protect investors by
improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other
purposes’’ (U.S. House of Representatives 2002, 1).
1
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Congress passed the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 and The
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) adopted Section 303A, Corporate
Governance Listing Standards, in November 2003 (effective in late
2004). The NASDAQ passed a standard similar to Section 303A in
November 2003.
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Compliance with these standards, however, is expensive.
According to a survey by RHR International, companies
with more than $4 billion in revenues spend an average of
$35 million to comply with Sarbanes–Oxley (Henry and
Borrus 2005). Thus, opponents argue that the costs of SOX
outweigh the benefits, and may make U.S. capital markets
less competitive (He and Ho 2011).
There is an abundance of research assessing the impact
of variations in corporate governance on the quality and
quantity of financial disclosures. Studies investigating the
relationship between earnings quality and corporate governance generally support the hypothesis that stronger
corporate governance practices lead to higher quality
earnings (see, for example, Bedard et al. 2004; Lee et al.
2007). Similarly, prior research generally provides evidence of an association between corporate governance and
disclosure quality (see, for example, Beekes and Brown
2006; Beekes et al. 2007; Byard et al. 2006; Karamanou
and Vafeas 2005). Finally, prior research shows that
stronger corporate governance is associated with more
extensive voluntary disclosures (Hidalgo et al. 2011;
Mallin and Raggi 2012; Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez 2010; Zhang et al. 2012).
We extend this line of research by investigating the
relationship between corporate governance strength and the
quality of disclosures in pre- and post-regulation time
periods. The enactment of more stringent regulations by the
SEC and the stock exchange had far reaching impacts for
publicly traded companies. SOX requires that each member
on the audit committee of a listed company is independent.
In addition, firms must disclose, in periodic reports to the
SEC, whether their audit committee includes at least one
member who is a financial expert. NYSE Section 303A
tightens the definition of independence and requires firms
to have a majority of independent directors. In addition,
listed firms must have audit, nominations, corporate governance, and compensation committees composed entirely
of independent directors. The regulations enacted by
NASDAQ in Sec. 4350 are similar to those of the NYSE.
These reforms were intended to increase the strength of
corporate governance mechanisms, thereby enhancing the
quantity and quality of disclosures by listed companies.2
Our research investigates the relationship between the
strength of corporate governance and both forecast
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accuracy and dispersion, which we use as proxies for the
quality of disclosures. Prior research supports the proposition that the accuracy and the dispersion of analysts’
forecasts are dependent on the quality of financial disclosures (Ashbaugh and Pincus 2001; Barron et al. 1998; Lang
and Lundholm 1996; Mensah et al. 2004). If cross-sectional
differences in corporate governance policies affect the
quality of financial disclosures, the quality of information
available to analysts varies with such policies. Specifically,
higher quality disclosures, produced as a result of strong
corporate governance, should lead to more accurate and
less dispersed analysts’ forecasts.
A primary objective of the regulations enacted following
the financial scandals of the early 2000s was to increase the
quality of financial disclosure in part by improving the
strength of corporate governance. If these regulations
resulted in more uniform corporate governance practices,
the association between governance and financial information quality may be reduced. This would weaken the
relationship between levels of corporate governance and
analysts’ forecast accuracy and dispersion in the post-regulation era. Thus, as SOX, NYSE Sec. 303A, and NASDAQ Sec. 4350 increased the regulatory environment in
the U.S., variation in the level of corporate governance
may not affect the quality of financial disclosure in the
post-regulation era.
Our analysis suggests that voluntary implementation of
stronger corporate governance enhanced the quality of
disclosures in the pre-regulation period; however, exceeding current corporate governance standards does not appear
to result in higher quality disclosures post-regulation.
Specifically, we cannot detect a relationship between the
strength of corporate governance practices and the accuracy or the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts post-regulation.
These results suggest that SOX and the stronger regulations
enacted by U.S. exchanges were effective in reducing
variation in the quality of financial information available to
investors. Further, our results suggest that firms should
carefully evaluate the benefits obtained and costs associated with their implementation of corporate governance
practices that exceed those required under current law. Our
results do not imply that compliance with strong corporate
governance is not important; to the contrary, SOX, and
other regulations result in more consistent disclosures
across firms.

2

A related line of research examines whether improvements in
corporate governance strength are associated with improvements in
operating performance, since more strict oversight may encourage
management to more efficiently and effectively carry out their duties
(e.g., Brown and Caylor 2009; Core et al. 2006; Klein, 1998). While
regulations on corporate governance may have additional objectives
such as enhancing operating performance, our study examines only
the reforms’ objective to improve the quantity and quality of financial
reporting disclosures.
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Background and Hypotheses
Prior research provides evidence that the quality and
quantity of financial disclosures is impacted by the strength
of corporate governance. Using forecast accuracy and
dispersion as proxies for disclosure quality, the association
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between disclosure quality and corporate governance has
been established internationally (Beekes and Brown 2006;
Beekes et al. 2007; Bhat et al. 2006) and in the U.S. during
the pre-Sox time period (Byard et al. 2006). Prior to SOX,
firms with stronger corporate governance are found to issue
voluntary disclosures of management reports on internal
controls (Bronson et al. 2006) and to discuss management’s
responsibilities for financial reporting (El-Gazzar et al.
2008). Additional research demonstrated that corporations
with more efficient boards (Karamanou and Vafeas 2005)
and more independent boards (Ajinkya et al. 2005) issue
more frequent and accurate forecasts by management.
Further, increases in the strength of corporate governance
are associated with greater voluntary disclosures related to
intangible assets (Hidalgo et al. 2011). Firms with strong
corporate governance disclose more information (Kent and
Stewart 2008) and more accurate information (Goodwin
et al. 2009) during the initial adoption of International
Financial Reporting Standards. Finally, studies using
international data find that the extent and quality of social
and environmental disclosures is associated with the
strength of corporate governance mechanisms (Mallin and
Raggi 2012; Zhang et al. 2012; Prado-Lorenzo and GarciaSanchez 2010).
Many studies find a positive association between the
strength of corporate governance and earnings quality.3
Specifically, firms governed by boards with higher portions
of independent directors are shown to be less likely to
engage in earnings management (Klein 2002; Lee et al.
2007; Sarkar et al. 2008). In addition, firms with more
independent boards of directors typically produce more
conservative financial reports (Ahmed and Duellman
2007). Sivaramakrishnan et al. (2011) suggest that
enhancement of corporate governance improves earnings
quality only to the point when an adequate level of corporate governance is achieved.
The composition of the audit committee is also an
important driver of earnings quality. Audit committee
characteristics (such as expertise and independence) have
been found to reduce the use of aggressive earnings management (Bedard et al. 2004). Additional research suggests
that specific elements (e.g., accounting knowledge, financial sophistication, and supervisory expertise) of audit
committee members enhance financial reporting quality
(see Carcello et al. 2006; Dhaliwal et al. 2006; Krishnan
and Visvanathan 2008; Xie et al. 2003). Overall, these
studies suggest that independent boards and knowledgeable

audit committees contribute to stronger corporate governance practices and result in less earnings management.
In addition, prior research suggests that stronger corporate governance reduces occurrences of fraudulent misstatements of financial information. For example, Persons
(2005), DeChow et al. (1996) and Beasley (1996) documented that the likelihood of fraudulent financial reports is
lower for firms with stronger corporate governance practices. Using a sample of firms under investigation by the
SEC for accounting fraud, Crutchley et al. (2007) found
that weak corporate governance allowed the adoption of
accounting procedures that resulted in earnings
manipulation.
In sum, research using data from the pre-regulation era
suggests that stronger governance yields higher quality and
quantity of disclosures, lower propensity to manage earnings, and lower occurrences of fraud. The regulations
enacted in the 2000s had a dramatic impact on corporate
governance requirements for firms in the U.S. Numerous
studies investigate the impact of these regulatory changes
on the disclosure quality and the presence of earnings
management. Most studies that compare pre- and postSOX eras examine the impact of the regulation on earnings
quality. For example, the passage of SOX has been shown
to reduce accrual-based earning management (Bartov and
Cohen 2009). Research utilizing properties of analyst
forecasts as proxies suggests that SOX increases the quality
and transparency of financial disclosures (Arping and
Sautner 2010; Begley et al. 2009).
Despite the enhancements in corporate governance and
increases in disclosure quality that result from new regulations (i.e., SOX, NYSE Sec. 303A, NASDAQ Sec. 4350),
few studies investigate whether corporate governance
variations still affect disclosure quality and/or quantity.
Chang and Sun (2009, 2010) examined corporate governance and earnings management in pre- and post-SOX time
periods using samples of cross-listed foreign firms and U.S.
firms, respectively.4 Their analysis suggests that individual
measures of corporate governance strength were related to
reductions in earnings management in the post-SOX period
only; however, overall corporate governance scores
exhibited a significant relationship with earnings management in both the pre- and post-SOX eras. A recent study by
Brown and Lee (2010) found evidence of a decline in the
strength of the relationship between corporate governance
and equity grants to CEOs between pre- and post4

3

A notable exception to these finding is Koehn and Ueng (2005).
Their analysis found no relationship between higher governance
scores from the Institutional Shareholders Services (ISS) and earnings
quality.

In both Chang and Sun (2009) and (2010), the authors used
2002–2003 proxy statements and earnings announcements after the
SOX effective date of July 30, 2002 to form their ‘‘post-SOX’’
sample. We define the post-regulation period starting after January 1,
2005. Our definition is cleaner because the NYSE and NASDAQ
changes were not effective until 2004 and probably took some time to
be fully implemented.
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regulation periods.5 Jennings and Marques (2011) evaluate
the impact of the strength of corporate governance pre- and
post- Regulation G.6 Their results suggest that non-GAAP
disclosures did not mislead investors in the pre- or postregulation period for firms with strong governance practices. The non-GAAP disclosures of firms with weak corporate governance, on the other hand, where misleading to
investors in the pre-regulation period. During the postregulation era, investors no longer appear to be misled by
the non-GAAP adjustments for weak governance firms.
Finally, Hossain et al., (2011) compared pre- and post-SOX
earnings management between firms implicated by the
SEC for backdating stock options and a matched control
group of firms. Controlling for differences in corporate
governance and internal control quality, they found that
implicated firms had higher earnings management compared to the control group in the pre-SOX period, but this
difference diminished in the post-SOX period.
Our paper attempts to determine if the well-documented, positive relationship between corporate governance and the quality of financial disclosures from the preregulation era continues into the post-regulation era.
Strengthening corporate governance may continue to provide improvements in financial reporting; alternatively,
increasing corporate governance past a certain point may
not lead to higher quality financial disclosure. A study of
international firms by Bhat et al. (2006) found that the
level of corporate governance is more important for firms
located in countries with fewer regulations. Further, Sivaramakrishnan et al. (2011) suggest that after reaching a
threshold level for corporate governance, additional governance measures do not appear to result in higher earnings
quality. Essentially, the ability of corporate governance to
improve quality may be bounded. If regulations passed in
the early 2000s elevated corporate governance to a sufficient level, exceeding those requirements may not lead to
variations in reporting quality. Thus, we investigate whether the regulations enacted by the SEC and U.S. stock
exchanges (i.e., SOX, NYSE Sec. 303A, NASDAQ Sec.
4350) elevated corporate governance of U.S. firms to a
level where, once reached, further enhancements would
not lead to significant improvements in the quality of
financial reporting disclosures.7
5

While this study does not examine the relationship between
corporate governance and disclosure quality, the evidence provided
establishes a context where the positive effects of corporate governance improvements are diminished in the post-regulation period.
6
Regulation G was adopted in January of 2003 and requires a
reconciliation of non-GAAP with GAAP performance measures. This
Regulation was passed as a provision of SOX to improve financial
disclosures for investors.
7
The enactment of regulations had far reaching implications for
publically traded companies. Specifically, SOX:
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In this study, we measure the quality of financial
reporting disclosures using analysts’ forecast accuracy and
dispersion. Prior research on analysts’ forecast properties
documents a strong link between disclosure quality and
forecast accuracy and dispersion. Lang and Lundholm
(1996) find that firms with more informative discretionary
disclosures are associated with higher forecast accuracy
and lower forecast dispersion. Using data from multiple
countries, Hope (2003) also finds that greater firm-level
disclosure increases forecast accuracy; Hope’s (2003)
evidence also shows that greater enforcement of accounting standards is associated with higher forecast accuracy.
Nonfinancial disclosures appear to improve forecast accuracy and dispersion as well. Vanstraelen et al. (2003) find
that analysts’ forecast accuracy is higher and dispersion is
lower for companies that provide forward looking nonfinancial disclosures. Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) find that
analysts’ forecast accuracy increases after non-U.S. firms
switch to International Accounting Standards which tend to
increase disclosure quality. DeChow et al. (1996) find that
forecast dispersion also increases in response to decreases
in financial reporting disclosure quality. Their study
investigates firms subject to SEC enforcement actions and
reports significant increases in analysts’ forecast dispersion
for firms identified by the SEC as manipulating their
earnings. Firms with more conservatively biased financial
disclosures are also associated with poorer forecast accuracy and higher dispersion (Mensah et al. 2004).
The research described above provides empirical evidence linking information quality to analysts’ forecast
accuracy and dispersion. Analytical studies of analysts’
behavior provide models that illustrate the relationship
between information quality and the characteristics of
earnings forecasts (see Diamond 1985; Kim and Verrecchia
1997).8 These models show that analysts use two types of

Footnote 7 continued
1. Increased auditors’ independence by limiting the auditors’ ability
to provide outside services (Section 201)
2. Improved internal controls and the assessment of material
weaknesses (Section 404)
3. Strengthened the responsibility of executives by requiring CEOs/
CFOs to certify financial statements (Sections 302)
4. Enhanced the corporate environment by requiring corporate
codes of ethics for senior financial executives (Section 406)
In addition, all three regulations sought to improve corporate
governance by improving the independence of the board of directors
and its members’ financial knowledge.
8
A related line of research examines whether individual analysts’
ability to forecast earnings has a ‘‘general’’ component in addition to a
‘‘firm-specific’’ component (see, for example, Brown and Mohammad
2010). We focus on the relationship between a firm’s information
quality and analysts’ forecast accuracy/dispersion since our primary
interest is the effect of firm-specific variability in corporate governance pre- and post-regulation.
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information to produce earnings estimates: information that
is available to all analysts (i.e., common information) and
information that is privately obtained or generated and,
therefore, is not available to all analysts (i.e., idiosyncratic
information). Publicly released financial statements are an
example of common information. An example of idiosyncratic information is data that are obtained from proprietary
forecast models. In addition, analysts are motivated to
efficiently use all sources of information (both common
and idiosyncratic) to produce the most accurate earnings
forecasts. In settings where common disclosures are of
inferior quality, analysts will tend to make less accurate
forecasts (Barron et al. 1998).9 The quality of common
information also affects analysts’ reliance on private
information. Specifically, analysts place more emphasis on
their unique information when common information is of
low quality (Barron et al. 2002). Thus, an increase in
analysts’ use of private information results in greater dispersion of earnings forecasts.
A primary objective of the new SEC and exchange
regulations was to improve corporate governance thus
increasing the quality of financial disclosures. As the
quality of disclosures improves, analysts are expected to
place less priority on obtaining private information (Barron
et al. 2002). If analysts use less private information when
firms have strong governance structures, analysts’ forecasts
for these firms are likely to have less dispersion. However,
these relationships will only exist if variations in corporate
governance affect the quality of financial disclosures. If the
enhanced regulations resulted in stronger and more uniform corporate governance practices or if the benefits of
exceeding prescribed policies diminished, the association
between governance and financial information quality may
be reduced. This would weaken the relationship between
corporate governance and analysts’ forecast accuracy and
dispersion. We directly investigate the possibility that the
relationship between corporate governance and analysts’
forecast accuracy and dispersion weakened from the pre- to
post-regulation eras. We test the following two hypotheses
in both pre- and post-regulation periods:

H1 Variations in corporate governance impact the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts

9
An analytical study by Beretta and Bozzolan (2008) on the richness
of disclosure content showed that the richness component of
disclosure quality was positively related with forecast accuracy and
negatively related with forecast dispersion. In addition, a recent study
by Drake, et al. (2009) identified disclosure quality as an important
factor in reducing investor’s mispricing of the accruals and cash flow
components of earnings (i.e., the accrual anomaly). Higher disclosure
quality may also assist analysts in making more accurate earnings
forecasts by reducing their overreaction to the accruals component of
earnings. Also see Chan, et al. (2004) for their analysis of current
accruals’ impact on future earnings and how the accrual effect can be
used to improve forecast accuracy.

H2 Variations in corporate governance impact the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts

Research Methodology and Sample
We examine the impact of variation in the strength of corporate governance on the quality of financial information
releases. Specifically, measures of analysts’ forecast accuracy and dispersion are regressed on variables quantifying
the strength of corporate governance as well as variables
which control for differences in firm attributes. The identification of an association between various levels of corporate governance and forecast consensus/accuracy suggests
that the quality of corporate governance impacts the quality
of information available to financial analysts and improves
their estimates of earnings. An explanation of the dependent
and independent variables used in the analysis follows.
Dependent Variables
Two proxies for the quality of financial information are
used in our analysis: forecast accuracy and forecast dispersion. Forecast accuracy is a common proxy for information quality (see, for example, Byard et al. 2006)
because analysts who possess high quality information
should produce more accurate earning forecasts. Following
Byard et al. (2006), we measure forecast accuracy as the
absolute difference between earnings forecast and the
annual earnings report, deflated by the stock price.
Accuracyt ¼ jForecastt  Actualt j=Pricet1
Forecastt represents the consensus annual earnings per
share (EPS) forecast immediately prior to the release of
earnings. Actualt is the firm’s actual EPS. Pricet - 1 is the
price of a company’s stock 1 month prior to the earnings
release.
Barron et al. (1998) show that consensus among analysts’ forecasts is also associated with higher quality
financial disclosures. We measure dispersion as the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts deflated by
the stock price the month prior to the release of the consensus forecast.
Dispersiont ¼ Standard deviationðForecastt Þ=Pricet1
Standard deviation (Forecastt) is calculated using the
standard deviation of the consensus annual EPS forecast
immediately prior to the release of earnings. Pricet - 1 is
the price of a company’s stock 1 month prior to the
earnings release.
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Independent Variables
We are interested in measuring the impact of corporate
governance on the information environment of analysts.
Most prior research utilizes quantitative scores as measures
of the strength of corporate governance. For example,
many studies evaluate individual components of governance including the percentage of outside directors on the
board and the number of meetings held by the audit committee and the total board (Farber 2005; Kanagaretnam
et al. 2007; Karamanou and Vafeas 2005; Vafeas 1999).
Recent studies utilized broad measures of the overall
strength of corporate governance. These measures include
Institutional Shareholders Services, which utilizes a ratings
template and Governance Metrics International which rates
firms relative to each other.10 In our paper, we utilized the
Gomper’s Index as an overall measure of the strength of
corporate governance. The Gomper’s Index classifies firms
as democracies (good for shareholders) and dictatorships
(bad for shareholders) based on 24 governance traits
(Gompers et al. 2003). We code the Gomper’s Index,
G_INDEX, as 0 if a firm is classified as a democracy and 1
if it is classified as a dictatorship. If strong corporate
governance improves the information environment of
analysts, firms classified as democracies should result in
more accurate and less dispersed forecasts.
In addition, we include three specific indicators of the
strength of corporate governance; DUAL, B_SIZE, and
%IND. DUAL indicates whether or not the CEO is also the
chairman of the board. Prior research (Core et al. 1999;
Jensen 1993) suggests that firms with a separate CEO and
Chairman of the Board have stronger corporate governance. Thus, the analysts’ forecasts should be more accurate and less dispersed for firms which separate these two
positions. B_SIZE measures the number of members on the
board of directors and %IND measures the percentage of
the board that is deemed to be independent. As B_SIZE
gets larger, the quality of governance may be strengthened
as larger boards are more likely to have more expertise
(Kanagaretnam et al. 2007). It is also possible that as the
board size increases, the effectiveness of the board declines
(Jensen 1993; Yermack 1996). Thus, we do not make a
prediction on the sign for board size.
Many view board independence as a necessary condition
for strong corporate governance (Uzun et al. 2004).
Research by Klein (2002) reports lower abnormal accruals
10

Koehn and Ueng (2005) provides a comprehensive overview of the
distinction between Governance Metrics International and Institutional Shareholder Services. See Brown and Caylor (2006) for an
example of a broad measure of corporate governance strength based
on ISS information. Specifically, Brown and Caylor (2006) use ISS
information to create a measure called ‘‘Gov-Score’’ that includes
both internal and external corporate governance provisions.
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as the percent of independent board members increases.
Xie et al. (2003) documents that independence decreases
earnings management, perhaps because of more effective
monitoring. Hence, as %IND gets larger, corporate governance is improved and should result in more accurate and
less dispersed forecasts.
We incorporated several control variables that impact
analysts’ forecast accuracy and dispersion in prior research.
NUM is the number of analysts providing earnings forecasts. Lang and Lundholm (1996) found that firms with
high quality financial disclosures are followed by more
analysts than firms with low quality financial disclosures.
Additionally, Brown (1997) documented improved forecast
accuracy for firms with larger analyst following. P/E is the
price to earnings ratio, which is a measure of the market’s
perception of the growth potential of earnings. Firms with
higher growth often have higher variability in earnings.
Both Lang and Lundholm (1996) and Brown (1997)
demonstrated that larger firms have greater forecast accuracy, perhaps because of increased public scrutiny. Thus,
we include the log of market capitalization, LOG_SIZE, as
a measure of firm size. We also include a dummy variable,
LOSS, which takes the value of ‘‘1’’ in a year in which a
firm reports a net loss. Analysts have more difficulty predicting losses, thus the accuracy of forecasts in loss years is
likely to decline and the dispersion of the forecasts is likely
to increase. Our final control variable, EPSSTAB, is the
5-year earnings stability measure provided by I/B/E/S. This
variable measures the average difference between EPS and
an EPS trend line. Firms that report more consistent
earnings over time are likely to result in forecasts that are
more accurate and less dispersed. Barron et al. (2002)
document that firms with greater variability in earnings (as
evidenced by larger changes in net income and larger
earnings per share deviations) indicate that the prior year’s
earnings are potentially less useful as a predictor of future
earnings. This may encourage market participants, including analysts, to increase their private information acquisition activities (Barron et al. 2002).
Sample
Our sample is comprised of firms that have data available
from The Corporate Library, Compustat and I/B/E/S. The
Corporate Library database contains information on the
corporate governance mechanisms and structure of boards
of directors of publically traded companies in the U.S. We
use this data to obtain the DUAL, B_SIZE, %IND, and
G_INDEX variables. We calculated the market capitalization of sample firms as well as their market to book ratios
using data from Compustat. We obtained analysts’ forecast
of EPS, actual EPS and the number of analysts following a
firm from the I/B/E/S database.
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Data were collected for the years 2002–2008. Matching
across the three data sources resulted in a final sample of
2,929 firms with complete observations. The sample is
divided into pre-regulation (2002–2004) and post-regulation (2005–2008) periods. A total of 1,101 (1,048) complete observations are available in the pre-regulation period
and 1,828 (1,761) are available in the post-regulation period for the forecast error (standard deviation) regressions.11

multiple and the I/B/E/S measure of earnings stability
increased across the two periods.
Pearson correlations among the variables are presented
in Table 2. Correlations using data from the pre-regulation
period are provided above the diagonal while data from the
post-regulation period are provided below the diagonal.
Both the G_INDEX and B_SIZE variables have a negative
and significant relation with forecast errors and dispersion
in both the pre- and post-regulation periods. Most of the
control variables are significant in the expected direction.
For example, in both periods, the number of analysts is
negatively related to the forecast error. In both time periods, firms with losses, denoted with a 1-0 dummy variable,
are associated with larger forecast errors and greater dispersion among analysts. None of the correlations between
control variables and variables of interest appear large
enough to suggest multicollinearity is a problem.12
Table 3 reports regression results for the relationship
between corporate governance and analysts’ forecast
errors. The first column reports the regression results for
the pre-regulation time frame. The G_INDEX is associated
with forecast errors during the period prior to new regulations. In other words, firms that are classified as dictatorships have somewhat larger forecast errors. Consistent
with this result, firms which have a joint CEO/Chairman of
the Board, also have larger forecasts errors. These results
suggest that firms that do not have corporate governance
practices to protect investors create an information environment with more uncertainty. The most significant relationship between forecast errors and governance practices
is the size of the board. In particular, as the board gets
larger, analysts’ forecast errors increase. This result is
consistent with Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996) who
suggested that larger boards are less efficient and tend to
follow the lead of the CEO. The control variables are fairly
consistent with expectations in the pre-regulation period.
As the multiple between market price and earnings
becomes larger, the magnitude of analysts’ forecast errors
increases. As expected, forecast errors are larger for
smaller firms, probably because there is less information
available in the public domain. Finally, firms with losses
are more difficult to forecast resulting in larger errors.
The results for the governance variables in the postregulation era reveal a weaker association between governance and the quality of disclosure. The G_INDEX, an
indicator of dictatorship or democracy, is not associated
with forecast errors in the post-regulation period. Table 1
reported that significantly fewer firms had a combination
CEO/Chairman of the Board role during the later time
frame. The regression results indicate that this distinction is

Results
The descriptive statistics for the sample firms are provided
in Table 1. The table includes t tests for differences in
means and Wilcoxon tests for differences in medians in the
last two columns. Analysts’ forecast errors tend to be relatively small compared to stock price, with a mean forecast
error of 2 % in the pre-regulation period and 1.3 % in the
post-regulation period. Interestingly, the mean and median
of the analysts’ forecast errors decreased significantly from
the pre- to the post-regulation periods. The dispersion in
the forecast errors, measured as the standard deviation of
the errors, also decreased significantly in the post-regulation years. These results might suggest that policies in the
post-regulation era improved the quality of financial disclosures resulting in better analysts’ forecasts. The corporate governance characteristics reveal some interesting
facts about our firms from pre- to post-regulation. First, the
number of firms with a single CEO/Chairman of the Board
decreased significantly from the pre- to the post-regulation
period. In the pre-regulation period, 35.6 % of firms had a
joint CEO/Chairman of the Board. Post-regulation, only
17.6 % reported a joint position. In addition, the percent of
independent board members increased from the pre- to the
post-regulation years. The size of the board was not significantly different between the two time periods. Overall,
these results suggest that firms implemented stronger
governance practices in the post-regulation period thus
supporting the proposition that the information environment improved during this time period.
Table 1 also reports that some of the control variables
changed significantly from the pre- to the post-regulation
period. The mean number of analysts, NUM, following the
firms decreased from the pre- to post-regulation period.
Further, the size of the sample firms significantly decreased
between the pre- to the post-regulation periods. Finally, the
number of loss years decreased from 9 % in the pre-regulation period to 4 % in the post-regulation period. The P/E

11

The number of observations in the standard deviation regression is
slightly smaller as at least two analyst forecasts are necessary to
calculate standard deviation.

12

Variance inflation factors were computed for each regression and
suggested that multicollinearity was not a problem.
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics for pre- and post-regulation periods
Variables

Pre-regulation (2002–2004)

Post-regulation (2005–2008)

N = 1,101

N = 1,828

Mean

Median

SD

Mean

Median

Difference

SD

t test

Wilcoxon Z

Error/Pi

2.018

0.849

3.053

1.344

0.591

2.605

-7.86***

-2.55***

SD/Pi

0.479

0.195

0.902

0.396

0.185

0.759

-5.26**

-7.27***

G_INDEXI

9.565

9.000

2.672

9.159

9.000

2.596

-0.56

-0.59

DUALi

0.356

0

0.479

0.176

0

0.381

-18.8***

-18.0***

-1.43

-0.99

B_SIZE

9.521

9.00

2.543

9.292

9.000

2.314

%IND

0.697

0.714

0.153

0.738

0.750

0.132

NUMi

11.13

10.00

PEi

21.46

17.22

7.028
106.59

10.67

9.00

23.95

17.90

7.539
96.67

LOG_SIZEi

7.802

7.637

1.512

7.784

7.578

1.442

LOSSi

0.091

0

0.287

0.044

0

0.204

EPSSTABi

47.82

30.00

52.37

47.99

29.00

55.00

9.82***

9.11***

4.29**

4.13***

1.88*

2.70***

5.67***
-12.0***
0.90

5.78***
-11.8***
1.77**

Variables are defined as follows: Error/Pi analyst forecast errors deflated by price 9 100, SD/Pi standard deviation analyst forecast errors
deflated by price 9 100, G_INDEXI Gompers governance index dummy 1 = dictatorship, 0 = democracy (median split), DUALi dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 if CEO is chair of the board, B_SIZE number of members of the board of directors, %IND percent of board that
is independent, NUMi number of analysts following the firm, PEi price to earnings ratio, LOG_SIZEi log of market capitalization in millions of
dollars, LOSSi dummy variable which takes the value of 1 in year of loss, EPSSTABi I/B/E/S measure of earning stability
***, **, * reflect significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively, based on two-tailed tests

not significant in the post-regulation time frame. Finally,
B_SIZE, which was significantly related to forecast errors
in the pre-regulation period at the 1 % level is now only
significant at the 10 % level.
The results for the control variables in the pre- and postregulation periods are fairly consistent. Larger P/E ratios
are associated with greater forecast errors in both time
frames. Interestingly, while smaller firms tend to be associated with larger forecast errors in both time periods, the
impact of size decreased significantly. This may be
attributable to improvements in corporate governance in
the post-regulation period that were applied more consistently across large and small firms. Loss firms in both time
periods are associated with greater forecast errors. Finally,
earnings stability, EPSSTAB, is more significantly related
to forecast errors in the post-regulation period although the
difference between the eras is not significant.
Overall, the analyses reported in Table 3 imply that
varying levels of corporate governance do not result in
variations in analysts’ forecasts accuracy or dispersion in the
post-regulation era. This suggests that variations in the
strength of corporate governance had less of an impact on
the quality of financial disclosure during this time period. A
potential explanation for this result is that regulations were
effective in establishing a sufficiently high level of corporate
governance that improved consistency in the quality of
financial disclosures. These standards resulted in enhanced
disclosures and less variation in the quality of information.
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This is consistent with the results by Bhat et al. (2006) who
documented that variation in the levels of governance
practices was more impactful in countries with less regulation. We believe that this result can be attributed to a more
level playing field in post-regulation. As all public entities
are required to maintain a certain level of controls, utilizing
controls above and beyond the requirements does not significantly enhance the information environment of analysts.
Table 4 reports the differences between governance
measures and forecast dispersion in the pre- and post-regulation periods. The G_INDEX and DUAL are not significantly related to forecast dispersion in either time
period, although the sign of the coefficient changes
between the two periods. Similar to the results for forecast
errors, as the size of the board increases in the pre-regulation period, forecast dispersion increases. However, in
the post-regulation era, the relationship between board size
and forecast dispersion becomes less significant.
The relationship between the control variables and forecast dispersion does differ significantly between the pre- and
post-regulation periods. In particular, the number of analysts
following firms is not as significant in the post-regulation
period. Also, the coefficient on size in the pre- and post-eras
is different. As SOX and other regulations were implemented, the information environment for large and small
firms appears to be more level. Somewhat surprisingly, the
coefficient on loss firms increased significantly in the post
period.

0.037***

•

INT.

0.036

•

Predicted sign

-0.18***

-0.156***
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Table 3 Regression analysis of cross-sectional relationship between
aggregate corporate governance measures and forecast errors

?

-0.103***

1.759
(4.33)***

DUALi

?

0.367

-0.091

(1.94)*

(-0.71)

B_SIZE

?

0.139

0.042

–

(3.40)***

(1.72)*

0.268

0.410

(0.44)

(1.08)

0.013

0.019

(0.67)

(2.18)**

0.004

0.002

(4.88)**

(5.42)***

-0.532

-0.238

(-5.48)***

(-4.40)***

LOSSi

6.592

4.094

EPSSTABi

(19.3)***
0.002

(15.2)***
0.006

(1.31)

(6.87)***

Adj R2

0.3226

0.1634

Obs

1,101

1,828

Variables defined in Table 1

***, **, * indicate significance at \0.01, \0.05, and \0.10 respectively

Pearson correlations before (after) regulation are above (below) the diagonal

t statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * reflect significance at the 0.01,
0.05, and 0.10, respectively, based on two-tailed tests

Variables defined in Table 1

-0.049**
0.002

0.022
-0.049**

-0.078***

3.412
(4.85)***

-0.066
(-0.66)

LOG_SIZEi

-0.004

-0.033

0.174***

Post-regulation

0.360
(1.89)*

NUMi

-0.019

0.387***

0.187***
EPSSTABi

LOSSi

0.324***

-0.084

0.669***

-0.036*
-0.017

0.174***
0.493***

-0.049**
-0.031

0.008
0.032

-0.018

-0.160***

-0.027
0.013
PEi

-0.172***

-0.110***
-0.034
-0.067***
NUMi

LOG_SIZEi

•
0.068
0.249***
-0.047**

0.294

0.067***
•

0.128**
•

0.114***
0.092

-0.024

0.003

0.122***

-0.059***

0.013
%IND

B_SIZE

-0.059*

0.171***

-0.047***
-0.009***
-0.023
DUALi

0.040*
-0.003
-0.028

•

-0.109***
0.122***
0.171***
0.039*
•
-0.043*
-0.044*
G_INDEXi

-0.034

-0.067***
0.014

0.003
-0.046*

-0.059***
-0.028

•

-0.038

-0.045**

-0.044*

0.467**
•

0.466***
SD/Pi

Error/Pi

NUMi
%IND
B_SIZE
DUALi
G_INDEXi
SD/Pi
Error/Pi

Pre-regulation

?

PEi

Table 2 Pearson correlations

Time period

G_INDEXi

%IND
0.036

-0.252***

-0.181***

0.035
-0.252***

-0.156***
•

-0.484**
•

-0.048**

0.022

-0.113**

-0.103***
-0.049**
0.691***
-0.037*

-0.002

-0.176**
0.458**

0.174***
-0.017

-0.027

-0.037
-0.033
0.008
-0.031

0.175***

-0.019
-0.084*
0.032
-0.034

0.187***
0.324***

0.387***
-0.160***

-0.172***
0.126

-0.027

PEi

LOG_SIZEi

LOSSi

EPSSTABi

Do Variations in the Strength of Corporate Governance Still Matter?

Overall, our results seem to imply that there are differences in the importance of governance measures pre- and
post-regulation. The new regulations may have altered the
information environment of large and small firms as the
relationship between firm size and both forecast errors and
forecast dispersion changed significantly in the post-regulation era. The results suggest that differences in levels of
corporate governance were important in the pre-regulation
period. However, as Sarbanes–Oxley and exchange rules
implemented more stringent corporate governance standards,
the information environment appears to be more consistent.
Thus, varying levels of corporate governance are no longer
indicators of analysts’ forecast errors or dispersion.

Sensitivity Analysis
Measures of Governance
Recall that we base the results of the primary analysis in
this paper on the dichotomous variable indicating the
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Table 4 Regression analysis of cross-sectional relationship between
aggregate corporate governance measures and forecast dispersion
Predicted sign

Time period
Pre reg

INT.

?

Post reg

1.114

0.714

(5.96)***

(5.81)***

G_INDEXi

?

0.018
(0.35)

-0.036
(-1.17)

DUALi

?

-0.031

0.044

(-0.59)

(1.14)

B_SIZE

?

0.037

0.016

(3.35)***

(2.19)**

%IND

–

0.106

0.089

(0.64)

(0.77)

0.024

0.011

(4.62)***

(4.06)***

NUMi
PEi
LOG_SIZEi

0.001

0.001

(2.54)**

(2.47)***

-0.197

-0.101

(-7.48)*

(-6.15)***

LOSSi

1.251

1.350

EPSSTABi

(13.3)***
0.001

(13.8)***
0.002

(2.61)

(6.42)***

0.2370

0.1588

1,048

1,761

Adj R

2

Obs
Variables defined in Table 1

t statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * reflect significance at the 0.01,
0.05 and 0.10, respectively, based on two-tailed tests

statements, Farber (2005) found that subsequent improvements in corporate governance are viewed with skepticism
by market participants. To mitigate the potential effect of
fraud on corporate governance practices, we re-evaluated
our analysis using prior year’s extreme negative returns as
a proxy for past negative events such as fraud. Specifically,
we exclude firms which experienced annual returns in the
bottom decile and in the bottom quartile. The results of this
analysis (untabulated) are unchanged from those reported
in the body of this paper.
Regressions with Recent Data
As previously noted, our primary analysis is conducted
using data from 2002 to 2008. We end our sample period in
2008 because The Corporate Library ceased including a
key measure of corporate governance, the G_INDEX. As
an additional analysis, we estimate regressions using data
from 2009 to 2011 excluding the G_INDEX measure.
Results of this analysis (untabulated) are similar to the
results reported in the post-regulation period.
Ranked Regression
Some prior studies (e.g., Barron et al. 2002) that utilize
forecast accuracy and dispersion as measures of disclosure
quality employ ranked regression rather than OLS regression. We re-estimate our analysis using ranked regression.
Results using ranked regression are qualitatively similar to
those reported above and do not change the conclusions of
our analysis.

strength of corporate governance. Sivaramakrishnan et al.
(2011) find that having adequate governance is significantly associated with the quality of earnings, exceeding an
adequate level of governance may not affect the quality of
earnings. To investigate the impact of adequate versus
inadequate corporate governance, we re-estimated our
models using various cutoffs for the G_INDEX variable.
Results of this supplemental analysis are similar to those
provided in the prior section of the paper. In addition, we
estimate our results using a continuous measure of the
strength of governance as defined by the Gompers Index.
Consistent with the assertion by Sivaramakrishnan et al.
(2011) the results using the continuous measure are slightly
weaker than those reported in the tables.

Regressions with Single Corporate Governance
Measure

Previous Fraud and Corporate Governance

Alternative Cutoff for Pre- and Post-Regulation Periods

Previous research finds a relation between previously
committed fraud and effectiveness of corporate governance
practices in overcoming the stigma (Farber 2005). Using a
sample of firms that engaged in manipulation of financial

Some provisions of SOX and security market regulations
took time to implement. Thus, it is possible that the effects
of the changes in regulations were not fully realized in
2004. Thus, we re-perform our analysis using 2005 as the
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In our main analysis, we include four proxies for the
strength of corporate governance: G_INDEX, DUAL,
B_SIZE and %IND. Correlations between governance
proxies (reported in Table 2) and variance inflation factors
(untabulated) computed in regressions do not suggest the
presence of multicolinearity among governance measures.
However, to insure that our results are not influenced by
multicolinearity, we re-estimate our analysis reported in
Tables 3 and 4 using one governance measure at a time.
Results of this analysis (untabulated) are consistent with
our prior analysis and our conclusions remain unchanged.
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cutoff date for the pre-post analysis rather than 2004. The
results of this analysis (untabulated) are unchanged from
those reported in the body of this paper.

higher quality disclosures and decreased dispersion and
errors in analysts’ forecasts. However, one significant
unresolved issue is the long-term sustainability of SOX and
the new exchange regulations. Begley et al. (2009) alluded
to the possibility that the more stringent governance practices may have only had a short-term impact on the
information environment. Past regulations seem to have a
strong impact initially but fade as time passes. For example, stronger regulations were passed by the SEC in 1933
and 1934 following Black Tuesday. Expanded regulations
for auditing procedures were passed in the late 1930s following the McKesson Robbins Scandal. More recently,
peer review processes and divisions of firms were required
after the Equity Funding and Continental Vending frauds
during the 1970s. Despite these regulations, corporate
scandals continue to occur across varying industries
throughout time. Most recently, markets were shaken with
subprime mortgage scandals that led to financial crisis in
the U.S. and globally.
As markets are further removed from the implementation of SOX and the scandals leading to its implementation,
it seems likely that organizations may comply with SOX
superficially. According to He and Ho (2011), mere compliance with ‘‘expensive internal monitoring and control
mechanisms may not necessarily bring substantial
improvement to the effectiveness of the corporate governance system.’’ How can the SEC and other regulators
work to maintain the impactful nature of SOX and other
regulations? He and Ho (2011) suggest that corporate
governance systems should not focus on implementing
more stringent monitoring; instead, corporate governance
systems should be primarily concerned with ethics education. Perhaps compliance with regulations like SOX in
conjunction with strong ethics education can lead to
organizations that continue to produce high quality disclosures which reflect the operating strategies and economic consequences of their activities.

Conclusion
SOX, NYSE Sec 303A, and NASDAQ Sec 4350 purport to
improve corporate governance structures across all firms,
resulting in a higher quality financial reporting environment. This goal is consistent with the aim of tightened
regulations in other countries as well. For example, Beekes
and Brown (2006, p. 423) state that two of the propositions
contained in the enhanced statement of principles of the
Australian Stock Exchange are that ‘‘better-governed firms
make more timely and more ‘balanced’ disclosures of both
good and bad news.’’
As a result of enhanced governance regulations, there is
likely less cross-sectional variation in corporate governance mechanisms in the post-regulation era. Presumably,
the resulting regulations enhanced corporate governance
policies in the areas most likely to compromise the quality
of financial disclosures. Thus, firms that choose to exceed
the prescribed standards after this time period may experience lower gains in disclosure quality. In such a setting,
the relationship between corporate governance and financial statement quality, and hence analysts’ forecast characteristics, would diminish. This argument is supported by
the research of Bhat et al. (2006) which reported that the
quality of corporate governance disclosures had an impact
on the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts, but that the relationship diminished as the strength of government
enforcement is improved. This explanation is also consistent with the results of Sivaramakrishnan et al. (2011) that
suggest that after reaching a threshold level for corporate
governance, additional governance measures do not appear
to result in stronger earnings.
Overall, our results imply that SOX and enhanced
exchange rules resulted in more consistent disclosures postregulation. Specifically, the research suggests that differences in levels of corporate governance were important
determinants of the quality of disclosures in the pre-regulation period. However, as Sarbanes–Oxley and exchange
rules implemented more stringent corporate governance
standards, the information environment across firms
became more consistent. Varying levels of corporate governance post-regulation do not predict analysts’ forecast
errors or dispersion. Essentially, SOX and other regulations
that increased corporate governance improved the quality
of the information available for analysts and others.
The short-term impact of Sarbanes–Oxley and new
exchange regulations appear to accomplish the desired
impact. Stronger corporate governance is associated with
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